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This post was edited by abramicus at 2013-5-20 04:53|
ON A GENERAL PARADIGM FOR RESOLVING BORDER DISPUTES AND EEZ DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND EVEN IN THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER:
There are many possible solutions. In the case of the overlapping EEZ's of the South China Sea, the following paradigm variation has a high probability of succeeding:
1. Using the UNCLOS definition of EEZ as applied to both countries, divide the overlapping region right in the middle.
2. Where disagreement exists regarding certain points on the proposed boundary, let a randomizing device decide on where the exact points should be subject to mutually agreed restrictions, such as that the total area each side gets must equal that of the other side, and that the deviation from the proposed boundary should not go beyond certain limits on each side of the boundary.
3. Where the economic value of certain oil or mineral reserves are uncertain, then let there be a bidding mechanism such that the side which gets the site pays the other side what it estimates to be the value of the site. If either side agrees to the demand of the other side in monetary terms, then the matter is resolved. If both sides cannot agree to the offer of the other side, then a random device is used to see which side gets the site. The "winner" gets the site, but pays the value of what it demanded for it to the "loser". In reality, there is no winner or loser, because the side that gets the site pays the the side that does not.
This is a variation of the "Cake Cutting Paradigm" in that the side cutting the cake is not the side choosing which side it gets. This keeps both sides honest as to the true value of the piece of cake (territory) it demands. Thus two bids are created.
For example, for Island X, China demands $10 B, and the Philippines demand $8 B. If either side agrees to the price of the other, then a sale is concluded. Say, China pays the Philippines $8 B, then the sale is consummated. Likewise, if the Philippines pays China $10 B then the sale is consummated. But if both were bluffing, then and neither is willing to pay the asking price of the other side, then Round-2 occurs.
A coin is tossed with the prior agreement that if it turns up heads, China must buy, and if it turns up tails, the Philippines must buy. Thus, if head came up, China must pay the Philippines, not the amount that the Philippines asked, but instead what China demanded, which is $10 B. And, if tails came up, the Philippines must pay China $8 B, which is what the Philippines demanded, not what China asked. In either case, the island will be sold to one side or the other. Sale closed.
Why do we have to do this? Because we need to keep both sides honest as to the true value of the island to them, and without this mechanism, there is no incentive for either side to be honest. Because the price that China demands in the first round becomes the price that China must pay in the second round, China has no incentive to inflate or deflate it. Likewise, for the Philippines. By forcing each other to be honest, the two sides are helping themselves agree to a fair exchange of land for money, in this instance. Money is used in this example because it is easy to illustrate.
But, a further variation of this could be, say that in exchange for Island X, China is demanding Islands A & B, while in exchange for Island X, the Philippines is demanding Island B & C. Again, the logic works its effect. In the first round if the offer of the other side is acceptable to either side, the deal is closed. But if neither is satisfied with the deal, a Round-2 coin tossing event is employed to break the impasse. If China wins, it will have to give up Islands A and B to the Philippines in exchange for taking over Island X. If the Philippines wins, it will have to give up Islands B & C, and take over Island X. Thus, there is no incentive for China to demand more in the first round than what it is willing to give up in the second round. Likewise for the Philippines. Thus, both sides are forced to be honest about the price they demand for Island X.
The problem can revert to a disagreement about what islands or territories are in dispute and thus must be put up for their Cake-Cutting-Auction. With this paradigm, the Philippines can make off like a bandit by putting all of Taiwan under dispute, for example. In order for China to retake any part of Taiwan, it would have to pay in kind or in specie, which is impossible. Thus, it is equally important to start with a definable boundary of the region in dispute, and a date on which such a boundary exists. In the case of the Taiwan-Philippine dispute, the boundaries of the territory in dispute are defined by the EEZ boundaries of Taiwan that are inside the Philippines' EEZ, and the EEZ boundaries of the Philippines that are inside Taiwan's EEZ. This area of dispute is well defined geographically, and can be date stamped to a past date, such as January 1, 2013. In the case of the Sino-Indian Dispute, the boundaries of the territory in dispute are defined by the claims of China on territory inside India's effective line of control, and the claims of India on territory inside China's line of control, which have been presented by both sides to each other in the past, and can be dated to January 1, 2013 as well. The territories to be put on auction do not preclude the bidder from offering other territories outside this disputed territory or monetary considerations as an exchange value, which the other side would have to pay in the first round to get the disputed area of interest, and which it would have to pay if it got the disputed area by means of a random device. Obviously, such "other territories" must be something that belongs to the universal set of disputed territories or which ever side demanded it in the first round would not be able to pay up in the second round, but money is certainly possible as an added consideration.
Think about it.
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