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This post was edited by abramicus at 2012-9-28 15:49|
sansukong Post time: 2012-9-28 13:07
Am I? How do you interpret that I am not friendly to China?
Now, this is what you have quoted to ...
THE INEVITABLE THIRD SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE METHOD TO WIN IN THE MADNESS
China's first priority is to maintain its sovereignty over Diaoyu, period. Everything else can be negotiated. This is exactly what FM Yang is telling Japan, which adopts the exact opposite attitude that its sovereignty cannot be negotiated, but everything else can be. This symmetry of moves reminds one of the ko-fights in Go where if there were no rule against more than three repetitions, all the stones would have been used up on just one point on the board. The way to break out of this senseless waste of military and economic resources on just one point on the map is for China to encircle a larger group of stones that makes Japan unable to persist in fighting over this one single Ko. By threatening a larger space, China can regain the tempo advantage that Japan now has based on its having occupied Diaoyu first, ahead of China. In this game of international Go, China has the advantage that the area it now controls is already larger than Japan's, and China also has more resources than Japan, i.e., more stones to play than Japan does. This is why Japan is using the Mutual Defense Treaty to prevent China from expanding the scope of the fight beyond Diaoyutai. Yet, the path to victory for China is to include the whole of Japan in the theater of operations. Once this happens, Japan loses all its advantages of initiative and technology, as the fight will be determined by quantity, not technology or speed. Like a chemical reaction that China wants to drive in one direction, and Japan wishes to drive in the opposite direction, China can pour in a lot more reactants on its side of the equation that forces the chemical reaction to operate on the basis of saturation kinetics and inexorably end up with the results that it wants.
Now, if Russia can help China secure its sovereignty over Diaoyutai, then it would be more reasonable for China to invite Russia instead of Japan to the negotiating table as to how to partner and share over the resources of the Diaoyu islands. In fact, Russia has a very good reason to do so. If Japan can wrest Diaoyu from China with impunity, it will definitely try to retake the four northern islands that it lost to Russia in WWII. How about a second and a third Varyag?
Actually, by just opening up a second railroad from Russia's oil fields to the coastal cities of China where fuel would be most needed in fighting Japan, Russia can assure China of its ultimate victory by enabling China to expand the war to all points on the perimeter and intersections of Japanese defense. Only in an all-out war can China take advantage of its size in population and resources against a technologically advanced Japanese Imperial Navy.
The well-known and well-tried formula is simply N^2*A or more generally, (N^k)*A, which quantitates the fighting value of one side of a conflict, where N is the number of combat units it possesses at the field of battle, and A is the firepower of each unit in terms of the amount of damage it can inflict on the enemy in one unit of time. On a flat open plane as the ocean, k equals 2, but when the terrain is irregular or blocked by islands and reefs or mountains, k approaches 1, and then in extreme situations, approaches 0.
Thus China would have to select a large enough size of battle in order to win against a technologically superior Japanese Nazi force, in short N^k*A, for China, must be greater than M^k*B for Japan, where N (China's fighting units) can be potentially much larger than M (Japanese fighting units) if China allows the conflict to extend to all points beyond Diaoyu, instead of limiting it to Diaoyu, for example. And, where B (Japanese technology) is given to be greater than A (Chinese technology), in that Japanese technology is more advanced than China's for requirements of the sea battles limited to Diaoyu. This can be reversed by China if it decides to change the scope of the fight to one involving larger areas using strategic weapons instead.
Thus, the logical scenario as the Third Sino-Japanese War unfolds will be that by trial and error, China will realize that the larger the area of conflict, the better it does against Japan, and eventually, that by employing its strategic weapons, as Truman did in the end, it can clinch the war decisively in its favor.
Of course, avoiding war is best if it can be done. But if Japan insists on staking its national survival on Diaoyu, it will eventually find that China will demand payment from every part of Japan, which Japan cannot defend or repay and will inevitably lose. Another mathematical model for this is called "The Gambler's Ruin" where the larger stake that the house can put down eventually bankrupts the smaller stake that an individual client can stake, regardless of the advantageous odds of the individual players, but more so if the odds are stacked against them, as when strategic weapons are put into play.
Japan has already lost the Third Sino-Japanese War on paper, and needs not try to use its own future as simulation material, because it will surely lose its entire future, forever, just as a bankruptcy ends the future of any company where the shareholders are partners in their national enterprise. Time to fold, for Japan, before China ups the ante far, far beyond what Japan is able or willing to pay for Diaoyu.