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This post was edited by abcfirst at 2017-10-29 03:39|
As to why the markets are so optimistic, maybe the market knows a lot more than the public is allowed to know, but since the markets are practically 99.9% outside North Korea, the market must know that regardless of the four outcomes, the world outside NK will not be significantly affected. Or, that "war" is just "status quo" as NK perceives it, and nothing will happen.
That might be the best solution for the markets, but it might not be for Trump or Abe, because in effect, it would be equivalent to a victory by NK, and defiance cannot be rewarded with victory.
Trump faults China for not demanding NK's denuclearization, but Kim could also fault China for not demanding Allies' guarantee of peace and normalization of ties. That China is not powerful enough to demand either, or to enforce both, is not China's fault. The two sides made it clear to China through their own actions, that China cannot stand in their way, and even threatened China with sanctions or reprisals that negate her authority and her strength.
If both sides ignore and threaten China as a referee or judge, how can they blame China for not upholding what is just and fair?
This is why China and Russia are letting the two sides play it out on their own terms. Putting pressure on China while bullying China only diminishes the credibility of China as a peacemaker, and if Trump thinks he can strong-arm China into besieging North Korea and starving it into submission on pain of being subject to the same treatment otherwise, then the problem becomes a war on China to upend North Korea, which three carrier groups would be inadequate to meet. But if Trump were to promise to respect China's authority in arbitrating its dispute with North Korea, he would have to stop challenging China's own claims of sovereignty over its 200-plus islands in the South China Sea, for every Freedom of Navigation exercise within China's territorial seas negates its ability to guarantee the sovereignty of North Korea, as it fails to guarantee its own sovereignty in the South China Sea. Thus, pressuring China will not produce a referee, but will likely force Trump to make good his threats on China, because he could not make good his threats on North Korea, avoiding the embarrassment of the latter by transferring the dispute to the former, and making the success of the former contingent of the latter campaign, one that is a hundred times harder and more dangerous.
Trump should therefore be extra cautious not to jump from the frying pan into the fire by making threats on China, and being forced to make good his threats by is political enemies at home, or by his supporters who even now wanted a trade war with China. Unless Trump is prepared to make concessions about the possibility of a guarantee of peace and normalization of ties with North Korea, his trip to China would have more risks than benefits, and therefore, cannot be made into the lynch pin of his Korean policy.